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Philip Pettit (2006) has argued that although it is sometimes rational to defer to 
majority testimony on perceptual matters—say, whether a car went through the 
traffic lights on the red—this is not generally the case with matters more deeply 
embedded in one’s web of belief—say, whether abortion is wrong. A key problem 
is that deference to majority testimony may lead to inconsistent beliefs. For exam-
ple, suppose one agent believes that p and q are both true, a second believes that p 
is true and q is false, and a third believes that p is false and q is true. Then p, q, and 
not-(p&q) are each believed by a majority, and thus deference to these majorities 
would lead to inconsistent beliefs. This is a version of the much-discussed ‘discur-
sive dilemma’ or ‘paradox of majoritarian judgment aggregation’(e.g., Pettit 2001, 
List and Pettit 2002, drawing on Kornhauser and Sager 1986).1
Pettit (2006) suggests that ‘[t] here is another . . . approach that will do bet-
ter . . . This is not to allow just any majoritarian challenge to reverse a belief but 
to allow only a certain sort of supermajoritarian challenge to do so’ (p. 184). As 
an illustration, he observes that, assuming consistent individual beliefs, there can 
never be supermajorities of 70 per cent believing each of p, q, and not-(p&q) to be 
1 Kornhauser and Sager’s ‘doctrinal paradox’ consists in the fact that, in decisions on a conclusion 
whose truth-value depends on multiple premises (e.g., the conclusion might be that a defendant is 
liable for breach of contract, and the premises might be that there was a valid contract in place and that 
the defendant did a particular action), majority voting on the premises may lead to a different verdict 
than majority voting on the conclusion. The ‘discursive dilemma’ (e.g., Pettit 2001, List and Pettit 
2002) consists in the fact that simultaneous proposition-by-proposition majority voting on multiple 
interconnected propositions (which need not be partitioned into premises and conclusions) may lead 
to inconsistent majority judgments.
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true. If there were such supermajorities, the inconsistency would have to show up 
in the beliefs of at least one individual agent.
It is easy to see, however, that a 70 per cent supermajority requirement is insuf-
ficient to prevent an inconsistency between a larger number of propositions. In 
a group of four agents, for example, there can easily be 75 per cent supermajori-
ties for each of p, q, r, and not-(p&q&r), even when each agent holds individu-
ally consistent beliefs, such as when the first agent accepts all but the first of these 
four propositions, the second accepts all but the second, and so on, as shown in 
Table 10.1.
When does deference to supermajority testimony guarantee consistency, and 
when not? In this short paper, I sketch an answer to this question, drawing on 
formal results from the theory of judgment aggregation (particularly Dietrich 
and List 2007, generalizing List 2001, ch. 9; for related results, see Nehring and 
Puppe 2007).2 Thus I follow Pettit (2006) in focusing on the consistency aspect of 
rationality (other aspects of rationality are beyond the scope of this paper).3 I state 
necessary and sufficient conditions for achieving consistency through super-
majoritarian deference and also for achieving something less than full consist-
ency: namely what I call ‘consistency of degree k’, in short ‘k-consistency’. This is 
the requirement that inconsistencies in an agent’s beliefs, if there are any, should 
not be too blatant, where k is an integer number capturing the degree of ‘blatancy’ 
of the inconsistencies ruled out, in a sense to be made precise. My argument gener-
alizes but also qualifies the observation that deference to supermajority testimony 
can sometimes be rational, at least on the consistency dimension.4
Table 10.1 A Supermajoritarian Inconsistency
p q r not-(p&q&r)
Agent 1 False True True True
Agent 2 True False True True
Agent 3 True True False True
Agent 4 True True True False
Supermajority of 75% True True True True
2 One difference between the results in my earlier related works (List 2001 and Dietrich and List 
2007) and the results in Nehring and Puppe (2007) is that the latter require completeness of judg-
ments, while the former permit incomplete judgments (as I do in this paper). For review articles on 
judgment aggregation, see List and Puppe (2009) and List (2012).
3 The somewhat broader title of this paper echoes the title of Pettit’s paper (2006). At the end of this 
paper, I offer some brief remarks about some aspects of rationality other than consistency.
4 For a more general treatment of the related problem of ‘judgment transformation’ (how agents 
can/should revise their judgments in light of the judgments of others) and a baseline impossibility 
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10.2. Minimally Inconsistent Sets and 
Supermajority Testimony
What are the simplest inconsistencies that can arise in an agent’s belief set?5 Call 
a set of propositions minimally inconsistent if it is inconsistent but all its proper 
subsets—obtained by removing at least one proposition from the set—are con-
sistent.6 For example, the sets {p, q, not-(p&q)} and {p, q, r, not-(p&q&r)} are each 
minimally inconsistent: each of them becomes consistent as soon as we remove 
any one of its members. By contrast, the set {p, p&q, not-p}, although inconsistent, 
is not minimally inconsistent: even if one of p or p&q is removed from it, it remains 
inconsistent. Any inconsistent set of propositions has at least one, and possibly 
many, minimally inconsistent subsets. It follows that any agent with inconsistent 
beliefs has at least one minimally inconsistent set of propositions among his or her 
beliefs. Conversely, any agent whose beliefs include no minimally inconsistent set 
of propositions is consistent throughout.
Under what conditions can deference to supermajority testimony lead an agent 
to believe a minimally inconsistent set of propositions?
theorem, see List (2011). It is worth addressing one potential objection to the present project of ana-
lysing the ‘logic’ of supermajority deference: why should we not simply let our response to any sort 
of testimony—whether majoritarian, supermajoritarian, or other—be guided by Bayesian condi-
tionalization? In particular, the testimony in question may be interpreted as a piece of information, 
and Bayesian conditionalization may tell us how to update our beliefs in light of it. This Bayesian 
approach, however, has two problems from the present perspective. First, it tells us how to update 
credences (degrees of belief), not beliefs simpliciter, which, like Pettit, I am focusing on here. Second, 
Bayesian conditionalization becomes possible in the present context only once we make fairly precise 
assumptions about the testimony-generating process, including assumptions about the reliability of 
the reported beliefs and the nature of their mutual dependence or independence. (For further discus-
sion, see also the last section of this paper.) By contrast, the present analysis of whether deference 
to supermajority testimony can yield consistent beliefs applies to beliefs simpliciter and requires no 
assumptions about the testimony-generating process. The cost is that this approach informs us only 
about one aspect of rationality, namely the consistency aspect, while being silent on other aspects that 
may be required for rationality simpliciter.
5 For the purposes of this paper, I define a belief set as a set of propositions accepted by an agent. Thus 
the present focus is on beliefs simpliciter (i.e., a proposition is either believed or not), not on beliefs that 
come in degrees (as captured by credence or subjective probability functions). Crucially, belief sets 
need not be complete. (A belief set is complete if it contains a member of each proposition-negation 
pair from some relevant reference set of propositions under consideration.) Propositions are repre-
sented by sentences in a suitable logic, such as standard propositional or predicate logic. Generally, 
any logic satisfying some minimal conditions (including compactness), as defined in Dietrich (2007), 
is suitable. Apart from standard propositional and predicate logics, many modal, conditional, and 
deontic logics are examples of logics to which the present analysis applies.
6 The significance of the notion of minimal inconsistency for problems of attitude aggregation 
was identified by Nehring and Puppe (e.g., 2007), who made extensive use of the notion of a ‘critical 
family’ of binary properties, which, translated into the language of propositions, is equivalent to the 
notion of a minimally inconsistent set of propositions.
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Fact 1: It is possible for a minimally inconsistent set of k propositions to be each supported 
by a supermajority among agents with individually consistent beliefs if and only if the 
supermajority size is less than or equal to k-1/k.
To prove this fact, consider any minimally inconsistent set of k propositions. 
Call them p1, p2, . . . , pk. I first show that supermajorities of size k-1/k (and by impli-
cation of smaller sizes) among agents with individually consistent beliefs can 
support each of these propositions. Take any set of agents divisible into k subsets 
of equal size. Suppose the agents in the first subset believe all of the k proposi-
tions except p1, the agents in the second subset believe all except p2, and so on. As 
every proper subset among p1, p2, . . . , pk is consistent—in particular, every subset 
obtained by dropping precisely one of these propositions—any such agent holds 
consistent beliefs. But now each of p1, p2, . . . , pk—that is, each proposition in a min-
imally inconsistent set of size k—is supported by a supermajority of size k-1/k.
Conversely, I show that supermajorities of size greater than k-1/k among agents 
with individually consistent beliefs can never support all of p1, p2, . . . , pk. Assume, for 
a contradiction, that there are k such supermajorities. For any two of these super-
majorities, even if maximally distinct, the overlap must exceed k-1/k–(1–k-1/k) = k-2/k. 
For any three, the overlap must exceed k-2/k–(1–k-1/k) = k-3/k. Continuing, for all k 
supermajorities, the overlap must exceed k-k/k = 0. So the supermajorities must 
have a non-empty overlap, implying that at least one agent belongs to their inter-
section. But this would mean that this agent holds inconsistent beliefs, contradict-
ing the assumption that all agents in question have individually consistent beliefs. 
This completes the proof.7
10.3. Ensuring Consistency
What, in light of Fact 1, could a rational policy of deference to supermajority testi-
mony look like? Or at least, what could such a policy look like from the perspective 
of preventing inconsistency in our beliefs?
Suppose the aim is to arrive at fully consistent beliefs. Consider the entire set of 
propositions on which beliefs are to be formed or revised. (In the theory of judg-
ment aggregation, this is called the agenda.) This set could, for example, contain 
all those propositions that occur somewhere in an agent’s web of belief. Let k be 
the size of a largest minimally inconsistent set constructible from these proposi-
tions and their negations.8 To illustrate, if the only propositions on which the agent 
7 A version of this argument was given in List (2001, ch. 9).
8 Formally, the agenda is assumed to be closed under (single) negation and thus to contain 
proposition-negation pairs. The significance of the largest minimally inconsistent subset of the 
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forms or revises his or her beliefs are p, if p then q, and q, then the largest minimally 
inconsistent set constructible from these propositions and their negations would 
be {p, if p then q, not-q}, and thus k would be 3. In the earlier example, where the 
relevant propositions were p, q, r, and not-(p&q&r), k is 4. If the set of propositions 
is larger and more complex, k can of course be significantly larger.
Fact 1 immediately implies that the policy of adopting all and only those beliefs 
held by a supermajority of size greater than k-1/k can never lead to an inconsistency. 
If it did, the resulting inconsistent belief set would have to include a minimally 
inconsistent set of propositions; but that set would contain at most k propositions 
(as k is the size of the largest minimally inconsistent set constructible from the 
given propositions and their negations), and Fact 1 implies that no such set can be 
supported by supermajorities of size greater than k-1/k among agents with individu-
ally consistent beliefs. Thus the following holds (Dietrich and List 2007, general-
izing List 2001):9
Fact 2: Let k be the size of a largest minimally inconsistent set of propositions construct-
ible from the propositions on which beliefs are to be formed or revised and their negations. 
The set of propositions that are each supported by a supermajority of size greater than k-1/k 
among agents with individually consistent beliefs is consistent.
However, for any supermajority size below unanimity, the set of propositions sup-
ported by supermajorities of that size is not guaranteed to be deductively closed: the 
propositions receiving the required supermajority support may entail other prop-
ositions that fail to receive such support (Dietrich and List 2007; see also Nehring 
2005). This means that deferring to supermajority testimony on propositions on 
which there is the required supermajority agreement while suspending belief on 
all other propositions (within the set on which beliefs are to be formed or revised) 
may not be a rational policy: it may make the agent vulnerable to ‘lottery-like’ par-
adoxes: the agent may believe several propositions but fail to believe some of their 
implications, even among the relevant propositions. (The classical lottery paradox 
consists in the possibility that an agent may believe of every single one among a 
million lottery tickets that this particular ticket will not win, while also believ-
ing that one of the million tickets will win.) In the present context, this problem 
agenda for the possibility of consistent attitude aggregation was also identified by Nehring and Puppe 
(e.g., 2007), albeit in a property-based rather than propositional-logic-based framework.
9 Related but not fully equivalent results (relying on a combinatorial notion called the ‘intersection 
property’) can be found in Nehring and Puppe’s work on binary attitude aggregation (e.g., 2007). As 
noted above, their relevant results require—unlike here—that belief sets be complete, i.e., for every 
proposition-negation pair under consideration, the agent has to accept either the proposition or its 
negation. In the present case, following List (2001, ch. 9) and Dietrich and List (2007), incompleteness 
is permitted: the agent may have no belief on some proposition-negation pairs.
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can generally be avoided only if the supermajority threshold is raised to unanim-
ity, a condition that ensures a deductively closed set of supported propositions. 
Empirically, however, unanimous agreement is rare, and so a policy of unanimi-
tarian deference would seldom lead us to acquire new beliefs.
Independently of the issue of deductive closure, another consideration may 
also push us in the direction of a unanimity threshold. As the set of propositions 
on which beliefs are to be formed or revised increases in size and complexity, the 
value of k—the size of the largest minimally inconsistent set constructible from 
these propositions and their negations—typically increases as well, and thus the 
supermajority threshold required to ensure consistency approaches unanimity.
10.4. Avoiding Blatant Inconsistencies
Achieving full consistency in one’s beliefs may not always be feasible. Indeed, it is 
perhaps unrealistic to expect the beliefs of a normal human agent to be consist-
ent. On the other hand, we do expect those beliefs to be free at least from the most 
blatant inconsistencies. When is an inconsistency blatant? An agent who believes a 
single proposition that is self-contradictory, such as p&(not-p), is clearly blatantly 
inconsistent. An agent who simultaneously believes a proposition and its nega-
tion, such as p and also not-p, is also fairly blatantly inconsistent, even if each of p 
and not-p is not contradictory by itself. An agent who believes three propositions 
which are in contradiction, such as p, if p then q, and not-q, is still rather blatantly 
inconsistent, but not as much as one who believes a self-contradictory proposition 
or a proposition-negation pair. An agent with inconsistent beliefs across five prop-
ositions, such as four logically independent conjuncts and the negation of their 
conjunction, is still inconsistent, but intuitively less so than any one of the earlier 
agents.
Now suppose that, although my large set of beliefs is inconsistent in its entirety, 
it turns out that every combination of 1588 or fewer propositions among my beliefs 
is consistent, and the smallest set over which I hold inconsistent beliefs contains 
1589 propositions. Should my beliefs still be described as blatantly inconsistent? 
Intuitively, the inconsistency here is much less blatant than in any of the earlier 
cases.
My proposal is to measure the blatancy of an agent’s inconsistency by the size 
of the smallest minimally inconsistent set of propositions believed by the agent. 
The smaller this size, the more blatant the agent’s inconsistency. To be sure, this is a 
rather simple and crude measure, but I illustrate its usefulness in a moment. In the 
examples just given, the values of the measure are 1, 2, 3, 5, and 1589, respectively, 
capturing the intuitive ranking of how blatant the inconsistencies in question are.
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Just as the blatancy of an agent’s inconsistency can be measured by the size of the 
smallest minimally inconsistent set of propositions among the agent’s beliefs, so the 
degree of consistency of the agent can be measured in a closely related way. Call an 
agent whose belief set is free from any minimally inconsistent subset of k or fewer 
propositions consistent of degree k, or in short k-consistent. For example, an agent 
who believes no self-contradictory proposition is 1-consistent. An agent who, in 
addition, believes no proposition-negation pair (and no inconsistent set of similar 
complexity) is 2-consistent. One who further does not believe any inconsistent set 
of the form {p, if p then q, not-q} is 3-consistent. And so on. In the contrived example 
of my less-than-fully-consistent beliefs, I would be 1588-consistent. Full consist-
ency, finally, is the special case of k-consistency for an infinite value of k.
Perhaps the best a human agent can ever hope to achieve is k-consistency for a 
reasonably large value of k. What could a policy of deference to supermajority tes-
timony look like if the aim were to achieve k-consistency for some finite value of k? 
The following corollary of the proof of Fact 1 answers this question.
Fact 3: For any value of k, the set of propositions that are each supported by a supermajority 
of size greater than k-1/k among agents with individually consistent (or merely k-consistent) 
beliefs is k-consistent.
To prove this fact, fix some value of k and assume, for a contradiction, that some 
set of propositions that are each supported by a supermajority of size greater than 
k-1/k among agents with individually consistent (or k-consistent) beliefs violates 
k-consistency. This set will then have at least one minimally inconsistent subset 
of k or fewer propositions. Consider the k or fewer supermajorities of size greater 
than k-1/k supporting those propositions. The proof of Fact 1 shows that these 
supermajorities must have a non-empty intersection, implying that at least one 
agent belongs to all of them. By implication, this agent must support a minimally 
inconsistent set of k or fewer propositions, which contradicts his or her individual 
consistency (or k-consistency). This completes the proof.
Of course, if the underlying set of propositions on which beliefs are to be 
formed or revised has no minimally inconsistent subsets of size greater than k, 
then k-consistency implies full consistency. In this case, Fact 3 reduces to Fact 
2. Otherwise, Fact 3 is more general.
Fact 3 suggests that, while full consistency may often be hard to achieve through 
deference to supermajority testimony short of unanimity, supermajoritarian def-
erence may nonetheless be a good route to k-consistency for a suitable value of 
k. And this remains true even if the agents constituting the supermajorities in 
question are themselves merely k-consistent. Thus, for any value of k, deference to 
supermajorities of size greater than k-1/k preserves k-consistency.
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In summary, the larger the supermajority threshold we require for the acquisi-
tion of a belief, the less blatant the inconsistencies we are liable to run into.
10.5. Coherence and Correspondence
For a sufficiently high threshold, deference to supermajority testimony may yield 
consistent beliefs; and for lower thresholds, it may yield beliefs that are not too 
blatantly inconsistent. In both cases, other beliefs, on which there is no sufficient 
supermajority agreement, may need to be revised accordingly.
Does this make supermajoritarian deference rational? My focus has been on 
‘coherence’ considerations: supermajority testimony is less prone to inconsistency 
than majority testimony. But ‘coherence’ is only one aspect of rationality and may 
not be sufficient for rationality simpliciter. A different aspect, on which my analy-
sis has been silent, is ‘evidential well-supportedness’, which, in turn, is motivated 
by ‘correspondence’ considerations. Does supermajority testimony in support of a 
proposition provide good evidence for the truth of that proposition?
There is one situation in which the answer to this question is positive, as in the 
simple-majority case discussed by Pettit (2006). This is the situation in which 
agents meet the (very restrictive) conditions of Condorcet’s jury theorem. That is, 
they each have an independent and better-than-random chance of making a correct 
judgment on each proposition in question (e.g., Grofman, Owen and Feld 1983). 
The probability of a correct majority judgment on such a proposition will then 
converge to certainty with increasing group size. Further, using Bayesian reason-
ing, it can be shown that the conditional probability of the proposition being true, 
given that it is supported by a majority (and, a fortiori, the conditional probability 
given supermajority support), will approach certainty as well (see, e.g., List 2004). 
Under these Condorcetian conditions, deference to supermajority testimony may 
be epistemically rational simpliciter, over and above yielding consistent beliefs.
In general, however, agents need not meet these demanding conditions on all 
propositions, let alone on matters deeply embedded in their webs of belief (see also 
Bovens and Rabinowicz 2006 and List 2006, Section VI). For example, as a simple 
consequence of the laws of probability, an agent cannot generally be as reliable at 
detecting the truth of a conjunction as he or she is at detecting the truth of each 
conjunct. The agent may have a probability of 0.7 of detecting the truth of p and 
also a probability of 0.7 of detecting the truth of q, but—if his or her judgments 
on p and q are independent from one another—only a probability of 0.49 of the 
detecting the truth of p&q. Thus, even if the agent meets Condorcet’s conditions 
(particularly better-than-random reliability) on each of p and q, he or she may not 
meet them on their conjunction. Agents who are highly reliable on ‘simple’ matters 
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(such as p and q taken separately) can still be less reliable on ‘composite’ or ‘deriva-
tive’ matters (such as p&q). Since the belief set of any agent (expert, witness, and so 
on) consists of ‘simple’ as well as ‘derivative’ propositions, we cannot assume that 
the Condorcetian conditions will be satisfied across the board. As a result, there 
is no guarantee that the majority, or supermajority, will be reliable on all proposi-
tions. Deference to majority or supermajority testimony may not be epistemically 
rational, even if such testimony is internally consistent.
An analysis of when supermajority testimony—over and above being consist-
ent—is a good indicator of the truth of the relevant propositions is beyond the 
scope of this short paper (for some relevant results, see Feddersen and Pesendorfer 
1998 and List 2004). But it seems wise to exercise caution in deferring to such tes-
timony. Before you take on a set of beliefs because there are supermajorities sup-
porting them, make sure these beliefs are not only internally consistent—which 
they may well be—but also likely to be correct.
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